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MARITAL STATUS AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
IN INFERTILITY CARE
By Richard F. Storrow*
Introduction
During a visit to her dentist in 1994 for a routine cleaning, Sidney Abbott disclosed on
her patient information form that she was a carrier of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV).1 Her dentist, Randon Bragdon, examined her teeth and found a cavity, but he refused
to fill it outside a hospital setting.2 In her subsequent lawsuit against Bragdon for violating
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Abbott testified that her HIV had influenced her
decision not to have children.3 In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled in Abbott’s case that the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), enacted in 1990, protects those living with HIV and
AIDS from discrimination because those conditions substantially limit the major life activity
of reproduction.4
Bragdon v. Abbott was a watershed for people living with HIV and AIDS and remains a
landmark in the landscape of ADA jurisprudence. It has significance, too, for the infertile,
who see in the language of the Supreme Court an acknowledgment that infertility itself may
be considered a disability.5 Whether one is infertile, however, is not as easy to determine as
whether one is a carrier of HIV. Infertility requires a more contextualized diagnosis than
does HIV and has been variously defined and understood. Does infertility exist only where
a heterosexual couple cannot conceive a child after engaging in sexual intercourse for a
certain period of time?6 Can gay and lesbian couples and single individuals also be infertile
even if they do not engage in reproductive sexual activity? The lack of fixed agreement
about what constitutes infertility raises questions about who is a deserving recipient of
assisted reproductive treatment. The answers to those questions have important implications
for those who need to employ assisted reproduction to have children and are hopeful of
finding a medical professional willing to help them.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE, AND UNFULFILLED
EXPECTATIONS 117 (2004).
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Id.
3
RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE
212 (2002).
4
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
5
Some district courts have declared infertility to be a disability under the ADA. Saks v. Franklin Covey
Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) aff’d in part, remanded in part, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003);
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1405 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Other courts have qualified this
doctrine. A mere “difficulty in reproducing,” McBride v. City of Detroit, No. 07-12794, 2008 WL 5062890, at
*5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2008) (citing Sauer v. Univ. Internal Med. Assocs., No. 1:06CV264, 2008 WL
731492, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2008)), and infertility brought on by aging, Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 326,
have been held not to be disabilities. In Sheils v. Univ. of Pa. Med. Ctr., the plaintiffs alleged a clinic’s
screening protocols constituted disability discrimination. Since the plaintiffs had not been denied infertility
treatment, their claim was dismissed. No. CIV.A. 97-5510, 1998 WL 134220, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998).
6
Mi Young Hwang, Infertility Options, 282 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 1888 (1999); Infertility, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/topics/infertility/en (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
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This article addresses, in particular, the obstacles gay and lesbian couples and single
individuals7 face when attempting to have children using assisted reproduction. As Marla
Hollandsworth sees it, “[p]arenthood for gay men and lesbians has always been an issue of
societal condemnation, social discomfort, and repudiation.”8 Single individuals, too,
especially women, elicit opprobrium and bias when they choose to have children on their
own.9 In the United States, where few laws exist that define who may and who may not
have access to assisted reproduction, these groups will face discrimination primarily from
unwilling physicians and laws that mandate insurance coverage only for those who meet a
narrow and heterocentric definition of infertility. In other countries, laws may explicitly
exclude gays, lesbians, and singles from eligibility for treatment. In still others, the
differential application of the law may stymie the efforts of same-sex couples to use medical
technology to have children. Individually, these laws may appear to have little impact on
the reproductive desires of nontraditional families. Collectively, however, they are a
reflection of the perspective that medical technology is most appropriately employed to
enable heterosexual couples to have children.
This article unfolds in the following manner: Part I discusses statutory and other legal
barriers that prevent gays, lesbians, and single persons from building their families with the
use of assisted reproduction. This part is divided into two subsections, one that addresses
laws that explicitly limit access to assisted reproduction to heterosexual couples and another
that examines laws and policies that are not on their face discriminatory but, in their
application, limit access by gays, lesbians, and singles. Part II explores the bias that some
infertility clinics may display toward gays, lesbians, and singles who seek treatment. This
part focuses on the United States, where laws prohibiting such discrimination are
uncommon. It asks specifically whether either laws forbidding discrimination in public
accommodations or medical ethics principles can effectively combat private discrimination
against gays, lesbians, and singles seeking access to assisted reproduction.
Statutory and Other Legal Barriers
Statutory and other legal barriers to assisted reproduction tend to reify what scholars
have identified as a heteronormative bias in the delivery of assisted reproduction.10 The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

7
For the purposes of this paper, the term “single individuals” encompasses single persons of all sexual
orientations and gender identities.
8
Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for
Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 184 (1995).
9
For Single Mothers, Stigma Difficult to Shake, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/134031175/For-Single-Mothers-Stigma-Difficult-To-Shake (reporting that
70% of approximately 3,000 Americans surveyed expressed the view “that single women raising children on
their own is bad for society”); Molly M. Ginty, Single Mothers-to-Be Face Bias, Race Ticking Clock, WE
NEWS (June 18, 2004), http://womensenews.org/story/health/040618/single-mothers-be-face-bias-race-tickingclock (reporting story of single woman denied treatment by clinic that “reserved donor sperm for married
heterosexual couples”).
10
Sarena Sairan, Queer Kinships: A Quandary of Love Without Borders 30 (2008) (discussing the
heteronormativity
of
Canada’s
Assisted
Human
Reproduction
Act),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.ryerson.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1548&context=dissertations; see also SHIREEN
KASHMERI, UNRAVELING SURROGACY IN ONTARIO, CANADA. AN ETHNOGRAPHIC INQUIRY ON THE INFLUENCE
OF CANADA’S ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT (2004), SURROGACY CONTRACTS, PARENTAGE LAWS,
AND GAY FATHERHOOD 106 (2008), available at http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/100.pdf ; Erez Aloni, Cloning
and the LGBTI Family: Cautious Optimism, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 57 (2011) (detailing how
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manifestation of this bias takes several forms, ranging from laws that limit the use of
assisted reproduction to heterosexual couples, to policies that deny legal recognition of
families that have already been created.11
Most developed countries have comprehensive legislative regimes that regulate access
to assisted reproduction. These legislative schemes can be categorized in the following
manner: (1) permissive; (2) cautious; and (3) prohibitive.12 Permissive jurisdictions allow
most procedures and typically do not limit access to assisted reproductive technology based
on marital status or sexual orientation.13 Cautious jurisdictions occupy a middle ground
between permissive jurisdictions and prohibitive jurisdictions in terms of the types of
procedures they will allow; however, they may permit only stable heterosexual couples to
have access to assisted reproduction.14 Assistance to single women is not permitted.15
Lastly, the prohibitive approach is characterized by bans on techniques that are elsewhere
embraced as mainstream procedures and by limitations on access to stable heterosexual
couples. In these jurisdictions, oocyte donation is banned outright,16 and there may be
similar restrictions on using donor sperm for in vitro fertilization (IVF).17
Facially Discriminatory Regulation
Facially discriminatory regulation of assisted reproduction either gives married couples
exclusive access or limits access to heterosexual couples. Other provisions are so readily
identifiable as excluding gays, lesbians, and singles that they cannot with any seriousness be
labeled neutral. For example, one of the most exclusionary statutory mandates, albeit rare,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
heteronormative assumptions underlie objections to reproductive cloning).
11
Kelly M. O’Bryan, Mommy or Daddy and Me: A Contract Solution to a Child’s Loss of the Lesbian or
Transgender Nonbiological Parent, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1116-17 (2011); Laura T. Kessler,
Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2005). Some perceive a “new illegitimacy” emerging
in the legal treatment of the children of same-sex couples. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”:
Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y &
L. 721, 740 (2012); Benjamin G. Ledsham, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same–sex Marriage Through the Lens
of Illegitimacy-based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2375 (2007).
12
See Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of Assisted Conception—Room
for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD 305, 306 (Donald Evans ed., 1996).
13
See generally HOWARD W. JONES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FERTILITY SOCIETIES
SURVEILLANCE 2010, available at http://www.iffs-reproduction.org/documents/IFFS_Surveillance_2010.pdf
[hereinafter IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010].
14
HOWARD W. JONES ET AL., SUPPLEMENT TO FERTILITY AND STERILITY, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
FERTILITY
SOCIETIES
SURVEILLANCE
2007
S18
(2007),
available
at
http://www.iffsreproduction.org/documents/Surveillance_07.pdf [hereinafter IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2007].
15
N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 187 (1998).
16
IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 13, at 47-48. The European Court of Human Rights, in S.H. and
Others v. Austria, ruled that Austria’s ban on oocyte donation and its ban on sperm donation for IVF did not
violate the right to private and family life. S.H. v Austria, Application No. 57813/00 (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325. The case is good evidence that the
European Court of Human Rights will not consider assisted reproduction to be a human right at any time in the
foreseeable future. Richard Storrow, S.H. v. Austria Denies Infertile Europeans Human Rights, BIONEWS (Jan.
23, 2012), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_117832.asp.
17
IFFS SURVEILLANCE 2010, supra note 13, at 46-48.
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is one that bars access to assisted reproduction unless the patients are able to demonstrate
their “medical infertility.”18
Although the Muslim world is relatively uniform in limiting access to assisted
reproduction to heterosexual married couples,19 mandated exclusion of unmarried persons
from access to assisted reproduction is unusual in developed countries.20 Oklahoma limits
artificial insemination to use by heterosexual married couples,21 and some jurisdictions that
allow surrogacy impose a similar requirement.22 Other developed countries, however, if
they place any restrictions on who may have access to assisted reproduction, tend to draw
the line at “stable” heterosexual couples.23 Even countries that ban egg and sperm donation,
insisting on the importance of genetic links between parents and children, do not always
require the couple seeking treatment to be married.24 Italy, for example, passed laws barring
all but heterosexual couples who employ their own gametes from having access to assisted
reproduction. This legal regime is recognized as the most restrictive in Europe.25 In passing
the restrictions, the fashioning of which was of particular interest to the Roman Catholic
Church,26 the legislature was expressing its belief that its formerly permissive stance caused
harm to the reputation of the country and its physicians, harm to future children who would
not be raised by their biological progenitors, and harm to donors from unsafe procedures or
conditions that exploit their poverty or vulnerability.
In the early days of IVF, the Warnock Commission in Great Britain considered how
reproductive technology should be regulated. Its ultimate recommendation was to limit
treatment to heterosexual couples based on the idea that children would fare better being
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

JOHN SEYMOUR & SONIA MAGRI, A.R.T., SURROGACY AND LEGAL PARENTAGE: A COMPARATIVE
LEGISLATIVE
REVIEW
22
n.110
(2004),
available
at
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/ARTOccasional%20PaperComparativeLegislative.pdf
(citing Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988); S. AUSTL. HEALTH, ACCESS TO ART AT A REGISTERED
CLINIC
IN
SOUTH
AUSTRALIA
(2011),
available
at
http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/60b1688043a636fca671eeed1a914d95/ART+FS1Access+to+ART-sahealth-2011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=60b1688043a636fca671eeed1a914d95.
19
Marcia C. Inhorn, Fatwas and ARTs: IVF and Gamete Donation in Sunni v. Shi'a Islam, 9 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 291, 300 (2005).
20
Richard F. Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption Through the Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP.
U. L. REV. 479 (2006). This is not to say there have been no efforts to enact such restrictions. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth
Weil,
Breeder
Reaction,
MOTHER
JONES
(Jul.-Aug.
2006),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/breeder-reaction, (mentioning bills that failed in Indiana and
Virginia).
21
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2012).
22
Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34 FAM. ADVOCATE 32, 34 (2011)
(mentioning Virginia); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (“The intended parents must be married to each
other.”)
23
Storrow, supra note 20, at 487-88.
24
See, e.g., Legge 19 Febbraio 2004, n.40, Norme in Materia di Procreazione Medicalmente Assistita, art.
5 (It.), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04040l.htm. France permits gamete donation but
requires that donations be strictly anonymous in the interest of creating nuclear family look-alikes. Ariane
Poulantzas, L’Anonymat dans la Procréation Médicalement Assistée: Entretien avec Jean-Marie Kuntsmann,
LA VIE DES IDÉES, (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.laviedesidees.fr/L-anonymat-dans-la-procreation.html?lang=fr.
25
Claudio Manna & Luciano G. Nardo, Italian Law on Assisted Conception: Clinical and Research
Implications, 11 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 532, 533 (2005).
26
Andrea Boggio, Italy Enacts New Law on Medically Assisted Reproduction, 20 HUM. REPROD. 1153,
1156-57 (2005); Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law on
Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 75-79 (2006).
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raised in a heterosexual-couple-headed household.27 The legislation that was passed in 1990
based on these recommendations required the licensure of assisted reproductive treatment.
Among the criteria necessary to consider in each case was the need of the child for a
father.28 During the years that this factor was a required consideration, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) permitted clinics to engage in a wide range
of screening practices, including best-interests screening.29 The clinical application of the
standard came under sustained attack by infertile couples and individuals, scholars, and even
members of Parliament30 as varying widely across clinics and resulting in discriminatory
and arbitrary screening within individual clinics.31 In response, the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) conducted a study on clinical screening practices in the
United Kingdom.32 In a remarkable turnabout said to be motivated to “provide greater
clarity and give clinics more confidence about deciding whether or not treatment is
appropriate,” the HFEA has quite pointedly embraced the avoidance-of-harm principle in
gatekeeping33 and has revised its code of practice with appropriate language.34 A new
guidance issued by the HFEA in November of 2005 permits nothing beyond fitness
screening.35 Henceforth, clinics in the United Kingdom must entertain a presumption in
favor of providing treatment and may not refuse treatment unless there is evidence that the
child is likely to suffer serious physical or psychological harm.36 The new approach has
been fully implemented as of January 2006.37 In a further development in 2008, Parliament
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27

DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SEC., Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and
Embryology 10-12 (1984) (U.K.).
28
See HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT, 1990, c. 37, § 25(1)-(2) (U.K.); HUM.
FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE 29 (6th ed. 2003), available at
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-3F57D79B-151028BF/hfea/Code_of_Practice_Sixth_Edition__final.pdf.
29
Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for
Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2316 (2007).
30
See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT FROM THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE: HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW,
2005, Cm. 6641, at 15-17 (U.K.); Louise Gray, Fertility Laws’ Revamp Could Allow Choice on Baby’s Sex,
The Scotsman (U.K.), Aug. 17, 2005, at 6.
31
Barry Nelson, Infertility Boss Calls for Rules to be Relaxed, THE NORTHERN ECHO, Jan. 20, 2005, at 15;
Lyndsay Moss, “Designer Baby” Review Launched by Government, WESTERN MORNING NEWS (U.K.), Aug.
17, 2005, at 42.
32
See HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., TOMORROW'S CHILDREN: REPORT OF THE POLICY
REVIEW OF WELFARE OF THE CHILD ASSESSMENTS IN LICENSED ASSISTED CONCEPTION CLINICS 6 (2005)
(U.K.), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/TomorrowsChildren_report.pdf.
33
Id. at 6 (“The involvement of a medical team in assisted conception means that certain third parties
have some responsibility towards the child to be born. However, the importance of patient autonomy means
that clinics should only refuse to provide treatment where there is evidence that the child is likely to suffer
serious physical or psychological harm.”).
34
See HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., CODE OF PRACTICE §§ 3.1-3.24 (6th ed. 2003),
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Code_of_Practice_Sixth_Edition.pdf.
35
See id.
36
See id. at § 3.1.
37
Improved Welfare Checks System Will Be Better, Fairer and Clearer for Fertility Patients, GPs and
Clinics, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/667.html.
This is likewise the case in Australia and Canada. See Julian Savulescu, Assisted Reproduction for HIV
Serodiscordant Couples: The Ethical Issues in Perspective, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 53, 53 (2003); Canadian
Parliament Approves the “Assisted Human Reproduction Act,” A Model of Responsible Policy, CENTER FOR
GENETICS & SOC’Y (May 17, 2004), http://www.genetics-and-society.org/policies/other/canada.html.
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altered the mandate to consider the child’s need for a father to read “the need for supportive
parenting.”38 This change was celebrated as a victory for same-sex couples and single
women alike. A similar inclusive spirit was behind the enactment of New Zealand’s
regulation of assisted reproduction in 200439 and recently concluded reform efforts in
Victoria, Australia.40
Some jurisdictions that have placed heterosexual marriage restrictions on access to
assisted reproduction have been forced to dismantle their restrictions based on prevailing
human rights norms. For example, two Australian states, Victoria and South Australia,
originally enacted laws that excluded all but married heterosexual couples and heterosexual
couples in “de facto” relationships from access to assisted reproduction.41 These laws
spurred interstate travel by single women and lesbian couples wishing to obtain treatment.42
In subsequent lawsuits against these states, infertility physicians who wished to accept single
women as patients claimed that these restrictions ran afoul of the prohibition on marital
status discrimination in Australia’s federal Sex Discrimination Act.43 The courts in both
cases found restraints on access based on marital status to be inconsistent with the Sex
Discrimination Act.44 The ruling did not open up infertility treatment to single women and
same-sex couples, however, as both jurisdictions’ statutes contained the requirement that the
patient presenting for treatment be medically infertile, a requirement that single women and
lesbian couples seeking treatment rarely fulfill.45
After many years of struggling for equal treatment in Australia’s states and provinces,
single women and lesbians celebrated the repeal, in December of 2008, of Victoria’s
Infertility Treatment Act of 1995.46 Instead of requiring patients to be medically infertile,
the new Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act gives access to assisted reproduction
procedures to single women and lesbian couples whose “circumstances” satisfy the doctor
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38

Human
Fertilisation
and
Embryology
Act
2008,
DEP’T
HEALTH,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Legislation/Actsandbills/DH_080211 (last updated July 26,
2010).
39
See HUMAN ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ACT 2004 § 4(a), SR 2004/92 (N.Z.), available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0092/latest/whole.html (listing child welfare as “an important
consideration”).
40
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND ADOPTION-ACCESS
(2005), available at http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/PositionPaper%2B1.pdf.
41
See, e.g., Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Cth) div 2.8 (Austl.), reprinted in 48 INT. DIG. HEALTH LEGIS.
24 (1997).
42
Liz Porter, When Baby Makes Two: The Journey to Joy for Women Who Decide It’s Better to Be a
Single Mum Than No Mum at All, THE AGE, May 9, 2010, at 10 (Austl.).
43
McBain v. Victoria (2000) 99 FCA 116, 119, (Austl.) (citing Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 22
(Austl.)); Porter, supra note 42, at 10 (“In 2000, McBain was responsible for the Victorian government
overturning its policy of restricting IVF to married couples. He successfully argued in the Federal Court that
the law was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act.”). The Act defines marital status as
inclusive of de facto marital relationships.
44
Id. at 124; Pearce v. South Australian Health Commissioner (1996) 66 SASR 486, 487-88 (Austl.)
45
Crystal Liu, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What Is a Justified Limitation on Reproductive
Freedom?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. &TECH. 291, 312 (2009).
46
Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 126 (Austl.), available at
http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubStatbook.nsf/f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e9200
0e23be/3ADFC9FBA2C0F526CA25751C0020E494/$FILE/08-076a.pdf; David Rood, Singles, Lesbians Win
Fertility Rights, THE AGE (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.theage.com.au/national/singles-lesbians-win-fertilityrights-20081204-6rqy.html.
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that the patient is unlikely to have a child without medical assistance.47 Medically assisting
a single woman or a woman in a same-sex couple to become pregnant creates a
presumption, via an amendment to the Status of Children Act of 1974, that the patient’s
female partner is also a parent of the child if she consents to a procedure, excluding selfinsemination,48 by which her female partner becomes pregnant.49 The semen donor and/or
egg donor is not a parent, whether or not he is known to the couple, or to a single woman
undergoing the procedure.50The most controversial amendment of the new law is the
requirement that patients presenting for treatment provide a “national criminal records
check” to their infertility physician, give permission to providers to perform child protection
order checks on patients presenting for treatment,51 and submit to two sessions of face-toface counseling.52 These requirements were for the purpose of ascertaining that:
No charges under clause 1 or clause 2 of the Sentencing Act 1991 have been
proven against the patient and her partner and that a child protection check is
provided which specifies that no child protection order has been made
removing a child from the custody or guardianship of the woman or her
partner.53
The medical infertility requirement, where it is still the law, remains a significant
barrier to treatment.54 The requirement continues to plague denizens of South Australia,
making it necessary that applicants for treatment be “classified as infertile,”55 and forces
lesbian couples to travel interstate to more permissive jurisdictions like New South Wales,
Victoria, and the Australian Capital Territory.56 Moreover, there is no presumption under
state law “of parentage for same-sex co-parents.”57 This can lead to problems between the
co-parent and the child’s school and medical providers.58 The good news is that the South
Australia legislature is close to dismantling the medical infertility requirement.59 Even so,
Medicare does not reimburse women who are not medically infertile.60 This disparity of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47

Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008, supra note 46, at s 10. This includes problems achieving
pregnancy, carrying a pregnancy to term, or the possibility that without treatment the woman might give birth
to a child with a genetic disease or abnormality.
48
Id. at s 3 (defining “treatment procedure”).
49
Id. at s 147.
50
Id.
51
Id. at s 42.
52
Porter, supra note 42, at 10.
53
VICT. STATE GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH, INFORMATION FROM THE CHIEF HEALTH OFFICER REGARDING
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS UNDER THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TREATMENT ACT 2008
(2010), available at http://www.health.vic.gov.au/art/documents/info_for_doctors.pdf.
54
Jenni Millbank, The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia: Cautious Regulation or ‘25 Brick
Walls’?, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 165, 180-81 (2011).
55
Id. at 181.
56
Wong
Highlights
IVF
Inequity,
STAR
OBSERVER
(Aug.
19,
2011),
http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/2011/08/19/wong-highlights-ivf-inequity/59189.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Lesbians
a
Step
Closer
to
IVF,
STAR
OBSERVER
(May
4,
2012),
http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/2012/05/04/lesbians-a-step-close-to-ivf/76870.
60
Porter, supra note 42, at 10; Soren Holm, Infertility, Childlessness and the Need for Treatment: Is
Childlessness a Social or a Medical Problem?, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF
ASSISTED PROCREATION 65, 70 (Donald Evans ed., 1996).
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approximately $10,000 between the cost that medically infertile women must pay versus
what socially infertile women must pay will remain an effective bar keeping some from
pursuing treatment.61
South Australian legislators are right to call into question the view that there is a
medical bright line separating those who may obtain treatment from those who may not.62
Medical infertility could result from conditions such as endometriosis, fibroids, blocked
fallopian tubes or azoospermia,63 but it also has a social dimension. A purely medical
definition of infertility would hold that a woman capable of becoming pregnant with
someone other than her current male partner is not medically infertile:
Let us imagine a couple in which the wife has developed antibodies against
specific antigens on her husband’s spermatozoa. This couple is infertile
when seen as a couple, but taken separately they are in perfect health. With a
change of partner each of them would be as fertile as anybody else.64
The South Australian approach, however, appears to allow treatment in cases not so
much of medical infertility but of reproductive incompatibility, introducing a social factor
into the definition.65 Indeed, the statute itself speaks not only of infertility but of the
appearance of infertility of the woman or her partner after they have engaged in the requisite
twelve months of unprotected sexual intercourse. 66 Reproductive incompatibility among
heterosexual couples, not medical infertility, is thus the primary key to accessing infertility
treatment in South Australia.
In order to bring single women into this discussion, as Stuhmcke does in her analysis67
and to further underscore the inescapable social dimension of infertility, I would go further
and, borrowing a line from the insurance industry, argue that infertility is not a medical
condition at all, because the condition itself cannot be cured through assisted reproduction.68
I am not here defending insurance companies that try to refuse coverage for infertility
treatment but simply wish to point out how unmoored the notion of medical infertility is
from any fixed, non-contextual reality. Commentators have noted that there is no fixed
definition of infertility, but that it is more than anything a social construct.69 Individuals are
not themselves infertile but are infertile only in relation to those with whom they seek to
reproduce. Infertility has meaning, then, only when we consider these particular pairings. If
only heterosexual couples can be infertile, then it is indisputably the same-sex feature of the
lesbian couple that lies behind the refusal to provide in J.M. and behind the restrictive
medical definition of infertility itself.70
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Courts have routinely refused to recognize this more rarefied understanding of
infertility. If we resort to the case law, we find that the courts that deem infertility a disorder
invariably do so with the use of the arbitrary medical definition, entrenching even further the
misguided view that only heterosexual couples can be infertile.71
I think infertility is better understood as a disability of which the effect on normal life
activities can be diminished by medical intervention. This understanding would include not
only heterosexual couples who wish to reproduce but cannot, but also gay and lesbian
couples and singles who have similar goals. Whether medical intervention is required at all,
therefore, would depend not upon marital status or sexual orientation but upon whether there
is volition to reproduce in the first instance. Just as heterosexual couples who do not want to
reproduce are not infertile, single women who wish to employ assisted reproduction are.
This approach to infertility may have the disadvantage of lacking the physiological and
copulative bright lines of the traditional medical definition, but it has the advantage of
making transparent the otherwise hidden social dimension of any diagnosis of infertility. It
has the further advantage of emphasizing that not all disabilities are medical conditions.
Infertility is one of these. It is a social condition that interferes with a major life activity, as
the Supreme Court recognized in Bragdon.72
The distinction between medical and social infertility does not have much influence in
the United States, where regulations defining who may have access to assisted reproduction
are virtually nonexistent.73 Instead, in the few states with statutes mandating that health
plans include coverage to help the medically infertile pay for reproduction-assisting
technologies, gays, lesbians, and singles will have to find other sources of financial support
to pay for the treatments they need. These mandates take two different forms: one group
requires insurers to offer infertility treatment to group plan sponsors; the other requires
insurers to provide coverage.74 For example, Hawaii, Arkansas, and Maryland mandate
insurance coverage for legally married couples.75 This may be meant to express societal
disapproval of reproductive technology for any but married couples, or it may be a statement
about the responsibility of the insurance industry to assist only those with a medical
condition. Either way, lesbian and gay couples and unmarried heterosexuals are excluded.
The legal definition of infertility in insurance legislation is informed by the medical
definition of infertility, the inability of an opposite-sex couple to achieve a pregnancy after a
year of engaging in regular and unprotected sexual intercourse. 76 Insurance laws in New
Jersey, Hawaii, Maryland, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, for
example, all define infertility as arising from some medical condition that prevents
pregnancy and is tied to some abnormality in the physiology of either the man or the woman
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who wishes to have a child with someone of the opposite sex.77 These definitions, if
determinative of who is infertile, suggest that infertility refers to those whose gametes or
gestational capacities render them unable to have a healthy child with their opposite-sex
partner. This definition does not include those who wish to have and raise children with
someone of the same sex or by themselves. As in South Australia, then, medical infertility
in the United States is a dividing line between heterosexual couples who cannot achieve
pregnancy and same-sex couples and singles who would also benefit from insurance
coverage.78
Facially Neutral Regulation
Many legal policies that impede gays, lesbians, and singles from having access to
assisted reproduction are facially neutral. These include bans on reproductive tourism, laws
that ban self-insemination and sperm donation by gay men, parentage laws that make it
difficult to achieve legal recognition of a social parent, and immigration policies that restrict
recognition of children born of surrogacy.
Some countries ban third-party gamete donation, thus limiting access to heterosexual
couples. Such regimes may be accompanied by bans on reproduction tourism, as in
Turkey’s ban on leaving the country for artificial insemination and New South Wales’ ban
on international commercial surrogacy.79 Although the European Court of Human Rights
recently declared that the availability of fertility tourism was a factor weighing against a
finding that restrictions on human-assisted reproduction violate human rights,80 many people
have no access to the means to pursue such travel, and most of the world lies outside of a
free-trade zone that allows Europeans to escape restrictive reproductive laws by traveling to
friendlier European countries. A gamete donation or surrogacy ban, coupled with a fertility
tourism ban, is the strongest prohibition yet devised on the creation of families headed by
gay and lesbian or single parents.
Related to bans on reproductive tourism are immigration policies geared toward
deterring international commercial surrogacy. Such policies may exist in countries that
either outlaw surrogacy or forbid its being the subject of a commercial transaction,81 leading
citizens of such countries to travel to jurisdictions like India, the United States, or the
Ukraine, where surrogacy is legal.82 Either way, such policies have a disparate impact on
gay male couples or singles whose sole reproductive option is to engage a surrogate to
contribute the gestational component to the creation of their children. Upon bringing a
child back to the country that prohibits commercial surrogacy, numerous families have
encountered serious problems. Not only will some governments refuse to recognize the
parent-child relationships in such situations,83 but France recently refused to recognize the
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twins born to a heterosexual married couple with the help of a surrogate in California as
French citizens.84 The Spanish press has reported that Spain’s similar response to
international commercial surrogacy has fallen disparately on the shoulders of gay men who
cannot “hide” the fact that they have pursued surrogacy abroad.85 Although England, which
permits uncompensated surrogacy, has dealt with such cases by applying the best-interests
of the child standard embodied in its parenting order legislation,86 the problems plaguing
those who seek to evade bans on surrogacy will not be resolved at any time in the near
future. Even India’s proposal to pass legislation that would require potential parents to
prove that surrogacy is permitted in their home country, that their sexual relationship is legal
in India, and that the child to be born will be permitted entry on the same terms as would a
biological child of the parents,87 would only likely induce potential parents faced with
restrictive surrogacy laws at home to pursue surrogacy elsewhere. The worldwide problem
has induced the Hague Conference on Private International Law to commence a study on the
possibility for some form of broader response to the problems arising in the context of
international commercial surrogacy.88
Immigration laws that inhibit surrogacy, by refusing to recognize the parent-child
relationships they create or denying children citizenship, bear a striking relationship to
regulation that makes it difficult for a social parent to achieve legal parenthood status,
whether by adopting their partner’s children or by petitioning for recognition as a functional
parent. Although it is analogous to step-parent adoption, second-parent adoption, where it is
available, does not require the legally recognized parent to be married to the party seeking to
adopt the child.89 Where it is forbidden, such regulation clearly targets the formation of
unmarried-couple families. Even where it is allowed, second-parent adoption requirements
are more onerous than step-parent adoption requirements.90 Adoption as a second-parent
provides a measure of protection to the non-biological parent of a couple whose relationship
is not entitled to any legal recognition under state law or who choose not to seek it. It is a
mechanism that has often been used by lesbian couples who have employed artificial
insemination to have children. Without recognition as a second-parent, the non-biological
parent risks having no right to a continuing relationship with the child if the legally
recognized parent later wishes to exclude her and the court refuses to give any weight to her
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functional parenthood.91 Second-parent adoption is not explicitly permitted in many states,
however,92 and not all states recognize functional parenthood,93 forcing couples whose
family formation efforts could benefit from legal recognition to consider whether they
should relocate to a friendlier jurisdiction, run the risks that lack of recognition entails, or
forego having children altogether. As a practical matter, prohibition on second-parent
adoption and a refusal to recognize functional parenthood may be as ineffectual in inhibiting
unmarried couples from pursuing assisted reproduction as are immigration laws aimed at
combating international surrogacy, but these are nonetheless potential barriers to the
formation of gay, lesbian, and single-parent-headed families via assisted reproduction.
Finally, several little-known attempts have been made to interfere with the ability of
gays, lesbians, and singles to gain access to assisted reproduction. Judith Daar mentions a
Virginia bill to require “all unrelated gamete donors [to] be identified in a woman’s medical
chart.”94 She explains that although the bill is facially neutral, it would have a “dramatic
impact” on single and lesbian women who are dependent upon anonymous sperm
donation.95 Additionally, an FDA-recommended rule would establish a “ban on gay men as
sperm donors unless they have been completely celibate for the preceding five years.”96
Obviously, this proposed rule is neither neutral nor free of stereotypes regarding who should
be allowed to donate sperm, but it nonetheless does not specifically target who may have
access to it. Moreover, the rule may not pose practical problems for most infertility patients,
since it applies only to anonymous donors and does not disallow one’s choosing a gay man
to be a known donor. Even so, the proposed rule is insidious in that it has been used as a
makeweight argument by doctors who would prefer not to serve gay and lesbian patients.97
Finally, bans on self-insemination98 impact access by lesbians and single women to a
common and relatively easy technique that assists them in conceiving children. One reason
why self-insemination may be so common among lesbians and single women99 is that
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“[m]any women may prefer the comfort of home and appreciate a more familiar
surrounding, as the insemination process, while not complicated, is quite personal and
invasive.”100
Barriers in the Clinical Setting
Where law is not the primary barrier to access, physicians, in their gatekeeping
function, may effectively bar gays, lesbians, and singles from gaining access to infertility
care.101 The medical infertility requirement was at the root of the sexual orientation
discrimination case J.M. v. Q.F.G. In this case, a lesbian was refused treatment by a
Queensland clinic whose semen donor program was restricted to heterosexual couples where
the male partner proved unable to produce semen of sufficient quality to achieve
pregnancy.102 J.M. sued under the Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of lawful sexual activity or partnership.103 The Court of Appeal of the Supreme
Court of Queensland concluded that the refusal was not due to her lesbianism, but that she
did not comply with the medical definition of infertility.104 Here we find full judicial
deference to a convention of the infertility industry to define infertility as “the inability to
conceive after engaging in unprotected heterosexual intercourse over a period of 12
months.”105 Thus, it turns out that J.M. had not been rejected for her sexual activity but for
her sexual inactivity, her refusal to engage in heterosexual intercourse for twelve months.
In the United States, the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics,106
promulgated by doctors to self-regulate their profession, speaks in terms of helping patients
who present with a “medical problem” or a “medical condition.”107 The ability to
distinguish medical conditions from other disorders may tempt infertility physicians to judge
that single women and lesbians who wish to reproduce do not present with a “medical”
problem, but a social one.108 An infertility physician may thus conclude, as did Q.F.G., that
medical ethics principles do not forbid her from refusing to treat gay or unmarried patients,
since the refusal to assist arises from a benign choice to help only those who present with
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medical issues. This justification for a refusal to treat has arisen in the past in connection
with contraception109 and voluntary sterilization.110
Today, there is admittedly very little evidence to suggest that infertility patients in the
United States are turned away by clinics based on whether they meet the test of medical
infertility as was J.M. by the clinic in Queensland. But medical infertility may be a reason
given to mask other forms of discrimination, some of which may be outlawed.111 This raises
the possibility that physicians may be faced with a choice between violating antidiscrimination laws and expressing their objection by refusing to treat gay, lesbian, or single
patients. Physician John Pearn has expressed his distaste for requiring doctors to treat
problems of social infertility.112 Patrick O’Connell and Jacques Mistrot have gone even
further in stating that doctors should not have to conform to anti-discrimination laws that
force them to perform procedures that are an affront to human dignity.113 These are not
simply extreme views but can arguably be found in the Code of Medical Ethics itself: a
religious physician might be tempted to invest the medical ethics principle that physicians
must act in the best interests of their patients114 with an admonition not to “assist [patients]
in harming themselves.”115 Consider as well that the wording of both Opinions 10.01 and
10.015 speak in terms of “medical problems,” “medical condition,” and “alleviate
suffering.”116 Such terms do not disable physicians from concluding that those presenting
with “social” infertility do not have a “medical” problem. Under this reasoning, even a
referral to another physician would not be necessary.
As noted above, there have been legislative reforms in some Australian jurisdictions to
do away with the exclusionary medical-infertility requirement, but a single mother who
desires artificial insemination to have a child and raise him alone, or a gay or lesbian couple
seeking egg donation or IVF with a surrogate, may be subjected to discrimination for
reasons having nothing to do with their inability to have children without assisted
reproduction.117 Clinicians may turn away single women, or lesbian couples not for failing
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to present with a true medical problem or a problem of “medical futility,” but for being
capable only of irresponsible or socially inappropriate parenthood.118 Individual physicians
may object to assisting patients who request help in building families that will not be headed
by married heterosexual couples. Although many physicians feel inadequate to the task of
making such an assessment,119 others may feel bound by a set of values to do so and may
believe such a decision falls comfortably within the ambit of their professional
responsibility. Laws banning discrimination based on family status, marital status, or sexual
orientation may help combat discriminatory decision making, but, sadly, in the United States
at least, almost half the states have no statewide prohibition of either marital status or sexual
orientation discrimination.120
The United States infertility industry on the whole is not known for turning away
patients. With no law regulating who an infertility clinic may accept for treatment,121 and a
medical establishment actively opposed to regulation,122 it is more likely that clinics will be
more committed to doing what is necessary to improve their success rates than with turning
away patients on matters of philosophical or religious principle. This effort to boost success
rates may cause clinics to “cherry-pick” patients in order to guarantee high success rates,123
misrepresent their success rates in order to attract more business,124 or even perform unsafe
practices in the hope of increasing the likelihood of pregnancy.125 There is a law that
requires clinics to report their statistics,126 but there is little oversight of this mandate and no
mechanism to enforce it.127 These realities of infertility practice in the United States might
suggest that discrimination against gays and lesbians by infertility clinics is not a significant
problem.
The fact that infertility clinics have little incentive to discriminate against gays and
lesbians does not mean that such discrimination does not exist, just that it is largely
hidden.128 A few cases are worth mentioning. In Minnesota, a court granted summary
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judgment to a clinic accused of refusing to artificially inseminate a lesbian because of her
sexual orientation.129 In Massachusetts, the parties settled a similar lawsuit before trial.130
In Florida, Dennis Barros and his same-sex partner planned to have a child with the help of a
surrogate mother, but the clinic they chose refused to provide services.131 Other cases have
involved single women and lesbians who alleged they were denied treatment because of
their marital status or sexual orientation132 or where their lack of a partner was of concern to
physicians.133 There is a body of empirical evidence suggesting that many clinics would be
likely to turn away single women and lesbian couples.134 Stories of clinics that reject single
women, gays, and lesbians are simply part of a larger culture clash between those who wish
to bring religiously motivated discrimination into the public marketplace and protected
classes seeking access to certain services.135 The lack of litigation over this form of
discrimination in infertility clinics is evidence that, as a practical matter, if refused treatment
at one clinic, applicants merely proceed to another.136
Whether infertility physicians should be permitted to refuse to perform procedures for
those of whom they disapprove has been the subject of an ethics report produced by the
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Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 199200 (2003).
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See Harlow, supra note 126, at 207-12.
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Id. at 212-13.
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Barros v. Riggall, supra note 98. The clinic claimed it was applying a Food and Drug Administration
guideline against using the sperm of sexually active gay men in infertility treatment. Littrell, supra note 97.
132
See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 15, at 185-86; Carol M. Ostrom &
Warren King, Infertility Clinic Accused of Past Bias—Women Say Lesbians, Singles Turned Away by UW
Facility,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
1993),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19931121&slug=1733101; Press Ass’n, MPs
Challenge Fertility Clinic Ban on Lesbians, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 2, 2006, at 7, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/03/politics.gayrights (highlighting the political response to fertility
clinics' refusal to treat single women and lesbians).
133
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L.
& MED. 7, 30 (2004); Lesbian Denied Fertility Treatment Wins Complaint, CTV NEWS (Oct. 1, 2005),
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20050930/invitro_lawsuit_050930/ (reporting on a ruling of the Quebec
Human Rights Commission that ordered a fertility clinic to pay thousands of dollars of compensation to a
woman who was refused fertility treatments because she was not accompanied by a man).
134
See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 15, at 187 (reporting on a survey of
Canadian clinics); Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive
Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 65 (2005); Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at
Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 591, 596-97 (2001); Patricia Baetens, Reproductive Services with Lesbian Couples, in
GUIDELINES FOR COUNSELLING IN INFERTILITY 109, 109-12 (Jacky Boivin & Heribert Kentenich eds., 2002),
available
at
http://www.eshre.eu/binarydata.aspx?type=doc&sessionId=ymvlvpn2etukjl45szfj01rm/psyguidelines.pdf
(explaining that many fertility centers do not accept lesbian couples for treatment); Jacky Boivin, Reproductive
Services with Single Women Without Partners, in GUIDELINES FOR COUNSELLING IN INFERTILITY, supra, at
113, 113-16 (exploring cases in which conception is prevented by a person's social circumstances, such as
being a single woman without a partner, rather than one's medical status).
135
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, When Gay Rights and Religious Liberties Clash, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June
16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486191 (describing ten examples of this
clash).
136
Laura Josephs, Therapist Anxiety about Motivation for Parenthood, in FROZEN DREAMS:
PSYCHODYNAMIC DIMENSIONS OF INFERTILITY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 33, 37 (Allison Rosen & Jay
Rosen eds., 2005).
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American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).137 ASRM issued a report related
specifically to the provision of services to gays and lesbians. ASRM identified three
important values at play in the ethical debate whether clinics may or must assist single
individuals and gay and lesbian couples: reproductive autonomy, child welfare, and
professional responsibility.138 The society concluded that the balance was best struck in
favor of equal treatment of heterosexual couples, single persons, and gay and lesbian
couples by infertility clinics.139 The society believes that in the absence of other factors,
being single, gay, or lesbian is not an ethical basis for the denial of treatment.140
Although discrimination against gays, lesbians, and singles may be ethically suspect,
the stark reality is that there are, as noted above, very few laws that prohibit such
discrimination. The following map illustrates the problem:

Where such laws do exist, it has been ruled that physicians’ offices are covered by the
prohibition.141 This is no guarantee, however, that a physician will not make a decision to
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Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and
Unmarried Persons, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1190 (2009).
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N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 15, at 186 (citing Cahill v. Rosa, 89 N.Y.2d
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clinics are places of public accommodation. Compare Duffy v. Ill. Dep't of Human Rights, 820 N.E.2d 1186,
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refuse or terminate treatment based on a patient’s sexual orientation or marital status.
Compounding the problem of combating discrimination even where prohibitions exist are
cases where physicians base their refusal to treat on a religious belief. The argument in such
cases is not that the religious nature of the refusal renders it nondiscriminatory but that, as
O’Connell and Mistrot point out, in matters of conscience, physicians should be exempt
from anti-discrimination laws.142 Some physicians even urge that the Code of Medical
Ethics provides cover for such refusals, as long as the refusal is a matter of conscience and a
referral to another physician is made in good faith.143
The best known case of this type is North Coast Women’s Health Care Group v.
Superior Court.144 The case presented the classic dilemma of a nontraditional family
seeking help from a conservative medical establishment in order to have children. North
Coast Women’s Care Medical Group contracts with insurers to provide infertility treatment
to their subscribers.145 Guadalupe Benitez, a lesbian, received basic infertility treatment
from North Coast under the terms of her employer-provided health insurance plan until it
became clear she would require intra-uterine insemination.146 At that point, North Coast
raised religious objections to helping her become pregnant, referred Benitez to a clinic not
covered by her insurance, and reimbursed her for the cost of treatment at the new location.147
Although the treatment at the new clinic was successful, Benitez brought suit under the
Unruh Act, a California law specifically prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
public accommodations.148 The California Supreme Court granted review after summary
judgment for Benitez was overturned.149 The Court framed the issue as whether a physician
is constitutionally insulated from the Unruh Act when the discrimination arises out of
sincerely held religious beliefs.150
Although the doctors claimed to have discriminatory motives only toward unmarried
women, a group unprotected by the Unruh Act at the time the relevant incidents took place,
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1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that the provisions of the public accommodations statute in question do not
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III-1.2000
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it was never definitively established whether they objected to treating unmarried women,
lesbian couples, or both. The Supreme Court did not have to resolve this issue to rule that
discrimination grounded in religious belief is not exempted from the Act’s ambit.151 In the
wake of the Court’s decision that doctors with religious scruples are not exempt from the
Act, North Coast and Benitez settled the lawsuit for an unspecified sum.152
One of the oddest aspects of North Coast was that the doctors Benitez and Clark
consulted had no objection to helping Benitez become pregnant at first.153 It was not until
she required the technique of intrauterine insemination that their religious scruples were
triggered.154 Even more peculiar was the obvious lack of agreement among physicians
groups weighing in on the matter about whether the actions of North Coast’s physicians
were permissible under the Code of Medical Ethics.155 The physician defendants, of course,
argued that the Code of Medical Ethics permits doctors to refuse to treat a patient for
religious reasons as long as they provide an immediate and effective referral to another
physician who will perform the service.156 Just as in Bragdon, where the American Dental
Association submitted an amicus curiae brief asking the court to rule in Bragdon’s favor,157
several medical societies believed that North Coast should prevail.158 But amid the flurry of
filings of amici briefs discussing the medical ethics aspects of the case was an equal number
taking Benitez’s side.159 The California Medical Association changed its mind in the middle
of the lawsuit.160 The briefs of the various medical society amici exhibited striking
disagreement about what the ethics rules governing their profession require.
It is generally accepted that a doctor may refuse the initial treatment of a patient for a
nondiscriminatory reason,161 but once a doctor has agreed to treat a patient, she has a duty
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not to neglect or abandon that patient. The debate in the amici briefs, then, was whether
North Coast’s physicians had breached any medical ethics rules in refusing to treat her but
sending her to another physician from whom she received successful treatment.162 It is thus
odd that none of the parties to, or amici in this case, considered the applicability of the Code
of Medical Ethics provisions concerning the neglect of patients and when a physician may
ethically refuse to treat a patient but must refer her elsewhere.
Opinion 8.11 of the Code of Medical Ethics reads, “[p]hysicians are free to choose
whom they will serve. The physician should, however, respond to the best of his or her
ability in cases of emergency where first aid treatment is essential. Once having undertaken
a case, the physician should not neglect the patient.”163 Opinion 10.01 describes the
fundamental character of a physician-patient relationship as a “collaborative effort” and a
“mutually respectful alliance” in which the parties share the responsibility for making health
care decisions.164 Within this framework, patients have the right to be treated with courtesy
and dignity and have the right to continuity of health care. “The physician may not
discontinue treatment of a patient as long as further treatment is medically indicated, without
giving the patient reasonable assistance and sufficient opportunity to make alternative
arrangements for care.”165 Added to this is the understanding from Opinion 10.015 that a
physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship in which the physician’s selfinterest is subordinate to his duty to promote the patient’s best interests and advocate for her
welfare.166 It may be possible to read into these provisions the anti-discrimination language
of Opinions 9.12 and 10.05, the Opinions that captured the attention of the various players in
North Coast, but one cannot do so directly, since those provisions apply to the acceptance or
denial of potential patients by their own explicit terms. It may be a good idea to assume
from the specific language of the Code of Medical Ethics Principles that a physician who
decides to discriminate in the course of an ongoing physician-patient relationship is not
respectful of the law, respectful of human rights and dignity, or even supportive of access to
medical care for all people.167 Perhaps the Principles’ Preamble can be read together with
Opinions 10.01and 10.015 to conclude that it is simply not honorable or respectful for a
physician to discriminate, because it is of no benefit to a patient, does not promote her best
interests and welfare, and arguably exacerbates rather than alleviates her suffering.168
Unfortunately, the vague and general language of these provisions, when contrasted with the
forceful nondiscrimination language embodied in the provisions applicable to potential
patients raises doubt, as North Coast noted,169 about whether any provisions of the Code are
suited to assist a court, or an American Medical Association disciplinary board for that
matter,170 in resolving a case like North Coast.
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At first blush, the resolution to the questions raised here about medical ethics principles
might appear straightforward. As a practical matter, Benitez did eventually receive what she
was seeking without any additional expense. Or did she? Anti-discrimination statutes are
meant to advance several compelling public interests beyond averting economic harm,
among these, combating “humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience to residents and nonresidents alike, . . . breaches of the peace, inter-group tensions and conflicts and similar
evils.”171 The scholarly literature on discrimination strongly indicates that discrimination
incurs a deep psychic cost, no matter what the other more material damages might be.172
Indeed Joann Clark, Benitez’s partner, eloquently captured the effect that discrimination has,
whether the aim of acquiring medical treatment is achieved or not: “[Clark] commented, ‘I
had no idea the depths that [discrimination] reaches. Personally and psychologically, it
destroys you.’”173
Conclusion
Gays, lesbians, and singles commonly encounter barriers when they seek assistance to
have children. Some will choose to bypass the medical establishment entirely and will selfinseminate; others will choose to employ an infertility physician in their quest to have
children. Because the practice of infertility medicine opens new and unfamiliar avenues to
family formation, it also raises fierce anxieties in society about who should be allowed to
become a parent and who should not. In this debate, entrenched attitudes about marriage
and procreation have been repackaged to express antipathy toward nontraditional families
and functional parenthood unbuttressed by genetic or gestational connections.
Unsurprisingly, then, many of the same battles about parentage and legitimacy that used to
arise from concerns about the place of marriage in society continue to be fought against the
backdrop of those who use reproductive technologies. Equally unsurprising is the prominent
role of marital status and sexual orientation discrimination in this struggle. Legislatures
have passed laws mandating the delivery of infertility care only to heterosexual couples.
Administrative agencies have enforced laws, otherwise facially neutral, in ways that exclude
gays, lesbians, and singles from pursuing parenthood. Finally, physicians, because they are
the purveyors of the technology, may perceive that they are entitled to exclude certain
individuals from having access to it based on the perception that certain classes of
individuals lack the capacity to provide minimally adequate care.
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Several of the legal developments detailed in this article indicate a slight trend in the
direction of relaxing restrictions on access to assisted reproduction by those not in
heterosexual relationships. It is a given that the science of assisted reproduction will
continue to evolve. In the future, it may even be possible for gay and lesbian couples to
have children genetically related to both of them, without the necessity of donor gametes
and surrogates.174 Such technology may not develop until far into the future. If that day
ever arrives, it is to be hoped that discriminatory animus against gays, lesbians, and single
individuals who wish to become parents will be a dim memory from a distant past.
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